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Defining Disability in the ADA: Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
During its 1999 term, the United States Supreme Court made a significant
interpretation of the word "disability" as used in the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA).' Satisfying the definition is critical to qualifing as a disabled
person under the ADA and thereby having recourse against disability discrimina-
tion. This note will examine Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.2 as well as its two
companion cases, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc? and Albertson 's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg.4 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner
was not disabled when his impairment was considered with corrective measures.
These cases shift the definition of disability in an employment discrimination
context from a consideration of disabilities without corrective or mitigating
measures to a consideration of disabilities after corrective measures.' The cases
following Sutton, with a focus on those in the Fifth Circuit, will be examined to
show how courts are dealing with this change in the law. Alternatives such as state
law remedies and the possibilities for distinguishing these cases will also be
considered. A brief history of disability legislation and the interpretation of the
definition of disability will provide a background to understanding the significance
of these new cases.
lI. THE HISTORY OF DisABIuIT DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
The disabled have been unsuccessful in fighting discrimination through means
available to other protected groups. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause which provides protection for other classes has generally been
defined very narrowly in the realm of disability discrimination.6 The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 has afforded little assistance as well.' The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1995). The ADA is a comprehensive anti-discrimination act
enacted "for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities ..... ADA: Findings
and purpose, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) (1995).
2. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
3. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
4. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
5. Mitigating or corrective measures can be "medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices" that
assist the disabled in overcoming their particular disability. 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(h) (1999).
6. Brian Doyle, Disability. Discrimination and Equal Opportunities: A Comparative Study of
the Employment Rights of Disabled Persons 79 (1995).
7. Id. at 80.
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was the first comprehensive national legislation targeting disability discrimination.8
The Rehabilitation Act first defined "individual with a disability" as a person who:
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.9
The Code of Federal Regulations under the Rehabilitation Act used this same
definition for "handicapped person."' 0 Although this was significant legislation,
the Rehabilitation Act did not reach private employment discrimination, because
it only applied to federal government agencies and businesses either holding
government contracts or receiving federal financial assistance." In 1990, Congress
enacted the ADA to provide a comprehensive method to eradicate private
discrimination against disabled persons. The ADA applies not only to employment
but to other areas of discrimination as well.'2
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was intended to broaden the
effects of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and extend protection against disability
discrimination to the private sector. Both of these acts "are remedial in
nature-they are designed to respond to the problem of discrimination."' 3 The
ADA could possibly be read to place disabled persons in a protected group with
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, however, the Supreme
Court has held otherwise."' In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the
Supreme Court held that the mentally ill were not a suspect class and that
government objectives only need to be rationally related to the discrimination.' s
When defining the term "disabled" in the ADA, Congress adopted almost the
exact definition from the Rehabilitation Act and, importantly, provided that
previous cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act would apply to the ADA. 6 The
8. Section 794 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section
706(20) of this title, shall solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service....
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1995).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1995).
10. 34 C.F.R. § 104.30) (1999).
II. Doyle, supra note 6. at 81.
12. Title I covers employment discrimination; Title 11 applies to state and local governments; Title
Ml governs public accommodations and commercial facilities; Title IV applies to telecommunications
for hearing and speech impaired; and Title V covers miscellaneous topics. ADA Handbook: Disability
Discrimination (Anderson Publishing Co. 1995).
13. Robert L Burgdorf, Jr., Disability Discrimination in Employment Law 9 (1995).
14. Id. at 11.
15. The Court did hold that denial of a special use permit for a group home was not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
16. The ADA provides for its construction in Title V. The pertinent provision reads: "nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 1 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies
pursuant to such title." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1995).
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only change made to the definition in the ADA was changing the term
"handicapped person" to "disability."'' 7 Congress delegated the power to create
regulations to enforce the ADA to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Department of Justice
(DOJ). In their respective Interpretive Guidelines, each agency separately defined
"disability" as the individual's impairment without corrective measures." Eight
United States Court of Appeals circuits agreed with this definition. 9 However,
Congress did not delegate to any of these agencies the power to define "disability"
as found in the first chapter of the ADA, which applies to the entire ADA.
The first cases under the ADA were not concerned with the problem of
corrective measures. In fact, the definition of "handicap" under the Rehabilitation
Act was rarely litigated. Those early cases decided whether plaintiffs had
disabilities without consideration of mitigating measures." There were only ten
reported cases that even dealt with a condition controllable by medication.2 For
example, one case concerned a manic-depressive (bi-polar) employee who was on
stabilizing medication. The court did not consider how the medicine affected her
condition.' However, in the last few years, the plaintiff's disabled status has
become the main issue in more than half of the claims filed under the ADA.'
Mitigating measures are in fact discussed in the legislative history and in the EEOC
Interpretive Guidance to the EEOC regulations enforcing the ADA.'
The employment provisions of the ADA are found in Title I. In order to sue
under the ADA, employees have to meet seviral burdens. A plaintiff must prove
that he is disabled, that he is a qualified individual for the job and that he suffered
an adverse employment decision because of the disability."
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1995).
18. The EEOC provisions will be emphasized in this note, as they are applicable to employment
discrinmination. The EEOC serves as a clearinghouse for discrimination claims. All complaints are to
be filed with the EEOC. which then investigates and decides whether to sue or give the claimant a right
to sue letter. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6 (1999).
19. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.. 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2144 (1999). These circuits are: First
(Arnold v. United Parcel Sery., Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (lst Cir. 1998)), Second (Bartlett v. New York State
Bd. of Law Examiners. 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cit. 1998)), Third (Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate
Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cit. 1997)). Fifth (Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, 152 F.3d 464 (5th
Cit. 1998)). Seventh (Baert v. Euclid Beverage. Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cit. 1997)), Eighth (Doane v.
City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997)). Ninth (Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362 (9th
Cit. 1996)), and Eleventh (Harris v. H & W Contracting Co.. 102 F.3d 516 (11 th Cit. 1996)).
20. E.g., Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505.517 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("insulin-dependent diabetic
is clearly a 'handicapped person' under the Rehabilitation Act). For other cases. see Ruth Colker. The
Americans with Disabilities Act. A Windfallfor Defendants. 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L Rev. 99,154 n.295
(1999).
21. See, e.g.. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital. 677 F.2d 1271 (9th Cit. 1982) (diabetes);
Davis v. United Air Lines. Inc.. 662 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1981) (epilepsy).
22. The court did not decide the case on the issue of mitigating measures. The court held that
she was not disabled because she was not "substantially limited" in working. The plaintiff did not prove
that she was precluded from a class of jobs. Mackie v. Runyon. 804 F. Supp. 1508 (M.D. Fl. 1992).
23. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 Notre Dame L Rev. 621 (1999).
24. Colker, supra note 20, at 139.
25. E.E.O.C. v. HBH Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-2632, 1999 WIL 1138533 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1999).
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The threshold question is whether an employee can prove that he is "disabled."
The ADA's definition of "disability" consists of three-prongs identical to those in
the Rehabilitation Act. The first prong is considered "actual" disability and
includes three major elements. The petitioner must prove that he (1) has a
"physical or mental impairment" (2) that "substantially limits" (3) a "major life
activity."2' 6 As will be discussed below, the courts have strongly emphasized the
"substantially limits" element. Such disabilities would include those in which a
person is confined to a wheelchair as a result of birth defects.
The second prong extends protection to those with a record of impairment.
27
This applies to people with a prior disability that has been corrected or persons
wrongly diagnosed. This would include someone with a history of cancer.2' The
reasoning behind this policy is the belief that a person with a record of an illness.
now corrected should not be discriminated against because of this previous
condition. The third prong extends protection to those whose employer incorrectly
regards them as having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity
by the employer. This would include a person whose employer believes he is
substantially limited by high blood pressure, when in fact it is controlled by
medication. Another example would be a person falsely accused of being HIV
positive. This person would be considered disabled because he was perceived as
disabled even though he did not have HIV.29
The definition of disability in the ADA, as well as its prongs and elements,
have been the main subject of ADA litigation and commentary in recent months.
There is a multitude of views on how the disability definition should be interpreted,
rewritten or amended.' There are also varying degrees of disabilities and a wide
range of consequential limitations. The Supreme Court has only recently begun to
acknowledge this problem,3 and even more recently actually handed down an
opinion that specifically affects the definition.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1995).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1995).
28. EEOC Tile I Interpretive Guidance 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1999). See U.S. EEOC Technical
Assistance Program, Disability Discrimination B-14 (1998).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (1999).
30. See, e.g., Isaac S. Greaney, Note, The Practical Impossibility of Considering the Effect of
Mitigating Measures Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 Fordham Urb. LJ. 1267
(1999) (advocating per se rule against considering mitigating measures to allow broader coverage of
the ADA); Michael J. Puma, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist Argument
Rejecting the EEOC's Analysis of Controlled Disabilities. 67 Goo. Wash. L. Rev. 123 (1998) (urging
Congress to amend the ADA to require individual inquiry in medicated state); Usa Eichhom, Major
Litigation Activities Regarding MajorLife Activities: The Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L Rev. 1405 (1999) (urging amendment to ADA
changing prohibition based on discrimination against a qualified individual with disability to one based
on discrimination because of the disability).
31. E.g., HIV positive woman proved substantial limitation of major life activity of reproduction.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the mitigating measure problem without discussion or resolution.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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NOTES
I. THE 1999 CASES: SUTTON, MURPHYANDALBERTSON'S
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court announced a significant change in
the definition of "disability" through its holdings in three cases: Sutton, Murphy
and Albertson's. In these cases, the Court held that disabilities must be considered
not only on a case-by-case basis but also in light of any corrective or mitigating
measures. This is significant not only because it makes proving disability status
more difficult but also for the reason that it contradicts the more commonly held
view that disabilities should be determined without considering corrective or
mitigating measures.
32
.A. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.
In Sutton v. UnitedAirlines, Inc.,3 the petitioners, Karen Sutton and Kimberly
Hinton, were twin sisters rejected for positions as pilots with United Airlines.
Sutton and Hinton did not meet the uncorrected vision standards set by the airline.
Both sisters suffered from severe myopia,3' causing their uncorrected vision to be
20/200 or worse in one eye and 20/400 or worse in the other. United's policy
required pilots to have 20/100 or better uncorrected vision. 5
Petitioners claimed they were discriminated against because of their disability
and subsequently brought this action under the ADA. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that petitioners were not disabled under the
ADA because the women are not substantially limited in the major life activity of
working if they wear glasses.36 The Supreme Court affirmed this decision by a 7-2
vote. The Court also held that the sisters were not regarded as disabled by United
Airlines."
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion rested on three grounds. The first
involved the "substantially limits" wording of the disability definition. The Court
held that because this language is in the present indicative sense, it requires that the
person be "presently" substantially limited. Therefore, if the person uses mitigating
measures to correct her disability, then at "present" she is not "substantially
limited." So Sutton and Hinton are not disabled because with glasses their vision
is corrected at present."
32. Eight U.S. appellate courts, the EEOC, the Department of Justice and the Department of
Transportation all defined disability without corrective measures. Sutton v. United Airlines. Inc.. 119
S. Ct. 2139, 2153 (1999).
33. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
34. Myopia is an eye condition commonly known as nearsightedness. Common measures to
correct this problem are glasses and contact lenses. Medical Dictionary (visited Mar. 10. 2000)
<http:/www.mdicinenet.com>.
35. Sutton. 119S. Ct. at2143.
36. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.. 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir.1997).
37. Sutton v. United Airlines. Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). Justice O'Connor wrote the majority
opinion, with Justice Ginsburg concurring and Justices Stevens and Breyer dissenting.
38. Id. at 2146.
2000]
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The second aspect of the decision focused on the necessity of an
individualized inquiry. The Court thought it would require reliance on general
medical information and speculation to decide if a person has a disability without
mitigating measures while the person is actually using mitigating measures. The
Court found that this would cause erosion of the individualized inquiry standard.
Finally, the Court was concerned that a lower threshold would bring too many
people under ADA protection. 9 The ADA findings note that there are 43,000,000
Americans with disabilities.' ° The Court decided it was impossible to include all
people who use mitigating measures into this category, because if that were done,
the number of disabled persons would increase to well over 100 million. Justice
O'Connor relied on a law review article which discussed figures used to draft a
similar 1988 ADA bill."' This article considered the approximate number of
disabled Americans taken from different sources and defining disability indifferent
ways.' 2 The Court found that if Congress had intended to include disabled people
whose impairments were corrected by mitigating measures, the number quoted in
the findings of the ADA would be much higher.' 3 The majority then tried to soften
its opinion by promoting alternate routes for people who may not fit into the first
prong of the disability definition. Instead, the Court suggested that one could still
use the "regarded as" or "record of" prongs of the definition."
The Supreme Court noted in Sutton that some people are disabled even after
considering corrective measures. For example, a person confined to a wheelchair
will still be substantially limited in several major life activities, including walking,
even if the person is capable of doing the job at issue."' The Court claimed its
reading will focus on the intended beneficiaries of the ADA: those who are
disabled but capable of performing the job.
The Court then focused on the petitioners' claim that they were discriminated
against because United "regarded" them as disabled by requiring a certain vision
standard. Because the Court focused on the fact that petitioners claimed to be
substantially limited in "working," they had to prove that United regarded them as
substantially limited in a "broad class of jobs." The Court looked at several factors
listed in EEO'C regulations including "the number and types of jobs utilizing
similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within the geographical area, from
which the individual is also disqualified."' In Sutton, the Court found that
petitioners were not regarded as disabled because they were only precluded from
one type of job, that of "global airline pilot." Other jobs related to aviation, such
39. Id. at 2147.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)(1995).
41. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. See Robert Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv. C. R.-C.L L Rev.
413, 434 n. 117 (1991).
42. See Burgdorf, supra note 41.
43. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2148.
46. Id. at2151.
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as regional airline pilot (the job petitioners previously held) were still available. 47
The Court hinted that if petitioners had claimed that they were regarded as
substantially limited in the major activity of seeing. they might have had a better
case.'
4
There were several issues that the Court brought up but did not resolve in the
case. The Court mentioned the EEOC's definition of "major life activities," but
declined to discuss whether it ought to give deference to the agency since the
parties agreed upon the definition. The Court also pointed out that "working" may
not really be a major life activity.' 9 Further, the Court did not resolve the issue of
what deference is due to the Interpretive Guidelines of the EEOC and Department
of Justice. These issues are likely to appear in future cases.
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion focused on the legislative findings that
"individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority" and "subjected to
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society... ."- She understood the findings to encompass a
smaller group than the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
defined. Therefore, people with common disabilities such as the petitioners should
not be covered under the ADA.
The dissent argued that the ADA should be given a "generous, rather than
miserly, construction." ' Justice Stevens traced the legislative history of the ADA
and its precursor, the Rehabilitation Act. He contrasted the majority's narrow
treatment of the ADA with the broad treatment given to other remedial acts
promulgated to fight discrimination against other groups. The dissent contended
that the Court should not restrict the ADA just because more people may be
eligible for the ADA's protection than Congress first envisioned. Justice Breyer
wrote in a separate dissenting opinion that Congress did not intend to exclude the
power to interpret the definition of disability from the EEOC. Rather, he wrote that
"only drafting or stylistic, not substantive, objectives" put the definition in the first
section of the ADA which no agency was delegated the power to define."
Therefore, the dissent would have given more deference to the EEOC.'3
B. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,s' UPS fired the petitioner, a
mechanic, because his blood pressure was higher than the maximum allowed for
certification by the Department of Transportation (DOT). The Supreme Court held
that with mitigating measures, namely blood pressure medication, Murphy was
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2150.
49. Id. at 2151.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1995).
51. Sutton. 119 S. C. at2152.
52. Id. at 2162.
53. Id.
54. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
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neither substantially limited in the major life activity of working, nor was he
regarded as substantially limited. Murphy was not precluded from working
generally; he was only precluded from jobs that required certification. Therefore,
Murphy was not substantially limited from working. His supervisors did not think
he could not perform the job, rather they merely followed a set standard.
Therefore, Murphy was not "regarded as" disabled. Consequently, Murphy's
medical condition did not qualify as a disability under the ADA."
C. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
In Albertson 's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg," a grocery store fired Kirkingburg, a truck
driver, because he did not meet the basic vision standards set by the Department of
Transportation (DOT). Kirkingburg only had vision in one eye. The Supreme
Court held that Kirkingburg was not disabled because he was not limited in the
major life activity of working. In order to be designated as disabled, Kirkingburg
would have to be prohibited from a class of jobs, notjust one specific job or the job
he most liked. The Court held that because he was qualified to work in other jobs,
he was not substantially limited from working. The Court also held that the
employer could use DOT safety regulations tojustify visual-acuityjob qualification
standards. Title I of the ADA allows employers to use qualification standards as
long as they are "job-related and consistent with business necessity.""7
IV. CONCERNS wrT REASONING AND FUTURE IMPACT
Justice O'Connor's resolution of Sutton raises several concerns. The majority
dismissed the need to look at the legislative history on the basis that the ADA
provisions are unambiguous, while basing a large part of the decision on the
congressional finding that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities .. 2."" A problem ensues because it is not apparent from the
ADA where this figure was derived. Therefore, the Court had to examine where
this figure originated. The majority opinion relied heavily on a law review article
written by one of the drafters of a similar bill attempted in 1988 and ignored the
more pertinent legislative history that supports the definition of impairment before
corrective measures.5 9 If the Court is willing to examine this law review article,
there does not seem to be a good reason to disregard the legislative history which
also helps determine who Congress intended to include under the ADA. If there
is a reason, the Court did not state what that reason may be.
55. Id. at 2134.
56. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1995).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(I)(1995).
59. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999). See Robert L Burgdorf. The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second.Generation Civil Rights
Statute. 26 Harv. C.R.-C. L. L Rev. 413, 434 n.117 (1991).
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The "present indicative tense" argument is not thoroughly persuasive either.
It is very easy to remove glasses for a vision test, which is obviously what
happened in Sutton's case. Therefore, Sutton's vision problem was not
hypothetical. In addition, doctors know the effects of diseases that occur at
different stages. Someone on medication for diabetes cannot stop taking medicine
for a period of time in order to prove that he will go into a diabetic coma, but
doctors can give medically accepted information on the effects of the disease
without the medication. This does not make the individual inquiry less important
as O'Connor suggests.'
Another concern is the Court's treatment of agency deference. Most of the
federal appellate courts have given deference to the EEOC regulations as well as
the Interpretive Guidelines based on the two part test developed in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc." Under Chevron, courts
are to assess first whether Congress's intent has been "unambiguously
expressed."' If intent has not been expressed, the courts are to defer to the agency
regulations unless they violate "permissible construction of the statute."' 3 In
Sutton, however, the Court reasoned that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was not
binding and that the EEOC did not have the authority to define disability.
Therefore, the Court was not bound by the definition as interpreted by these
agencies." However, the ADA is supposed to follow legislative history from the
Rehabilitation Act.63 Under the Rehabilitation Act, deference to agency regulations
was very strong."6 Following this reasoning, the Court should be bound by agency
deference and would be required to give stronger weight to the EEOC Interpretive
Guidelines.
These recent decisions will not reduce the number of frivolous suits or the
number of legitimate claims. Disability claims can still be filed, but the decision
in Sutton will just make it harder to prove a disability. The emphasis will simply
shift to more litigation and debate concerning questions basically ignored or
previously uncontroversial such as the "substantially limits" factor and claims of
"regarded as" discrimination.
Furthermore, employers do not seem to need much help in this area.
Employers already win 92% of the ADA claims filed against them.67 Even the
60. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
61. 467U.S.837, 104S.Ct.2778(1984).
62. Id. at 843, 104 S. Ct. at 2781.
63. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2782. For more discussion of the Chevron doctrine as applied to the EEOC
and ADA. see Jonathan Bridges, Note, Mitigating Measures Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Interpretation and Deference in the Judicial Process, 74 Notre Dame L Rev. 1061 (1999).
64. Sutton. 119 S. Ct. at 2144.
65. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202(1998) (interpreting 42
U.S.C. § 12201).
66. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone. 465 U.S. 624,104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984) (agencydeference
particularly appropriate for section 504); School Bd. Of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987) (Court relied heavily on HHS position that tuberculosis was a disability); see
Colker, supra note 20, at 138.
67. This rate is from a study of more than 1,200 cases decided under Tide I. Adin C. Goldberg,
Supreme Court Sends Mixed Signals in ADA Employment Cases, 7 Metro. Corp. Couns. 7 (1999). The
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EEOC rejects 86% of the charges filed with it to investigate discrimination
claims.6 The courts are not allowing frivolous claimants to prevail. If someone
claims disability on the basis of a sore finger, no reasonable court will allow this
claim to go forward. However, if someone is truly disabled, he now has to provide
stronger evidence to prove his disability just to get in the door of the courthouse.
This seems to be defeating the purposes of the ADA.
V. IMPAcr: DESPAIR OR ELATION?
A. Initial Reaction
There have been mixed reviews of the recent ADA cases." Disability
-advocates are upset about the narrowing of the term disability. When referring to
the Court's treatment of the ADA, a disability discrimination lawyer exclaimed
"[tihey gutted it."70 She points out that although the Court requires corrective
measures to be considered, the discrimination in Sutton occurred without the
correcting measures.7' Although with glasses the petitioners' impairments were
fully corrected, the discrimination was based on their vision before the glasses were
used. The same attorney also stated that "the Court's acceptance of second class
rights and protections for people with disabilities" is "the saddest thing."" She
thinks this "illogical reading of the ADA essentially eviscerates protection for the
vast number of people with disabilities who are able to mitigate their disabilities so
that it hardly affects their lives or their ability to do their job."7"
However, others, especially rejoicing employers, strongly support the Court's
decisions, claiming that the rulings provide them much needed guidance in the area
of disability discrimination.74 One defense attorney remarked that the ADA has
been abused and that the Court was correct in limiting its scope." Employers also
hope that the narrower definition will reduce the number of frivolous suits being
filed.7" Others have been more moderate. An editorial in the New Jersey Law
Journal noted that the Court, "faced with an inadequate statute, strained to reach
American Bar Association reported the same percentage of the 700 cases resolved from 1992-97.
Justices Limit Claims Under Disabilities Act, 221 N.Y.L.J. 119 (1999).
68. Goldberg, supra note 67.
69. Defense labor and employment attorneys like the narrowed definition, while some disability
advocates claim Sutton a "death knell." Robert T. Zielinski. The Pendulum Swings: 1999 In Review-A
Defense Lawyer's Perspective, 614 PLI/Lit 193, 195 (1999).
70. Shannon P. Duffy, U.S. Supreme Court's ADA Rulings Shake Plaintif's Employment Bar,
220 The Legal Intelligencer 121 (1999).
71. Id.
72. Lisa Rau, From the Plaintiff Perspective: Shift in Strategy May Salvage Cases. 22 Pa. L
Wkly. 32 (1999).
73. Id.
74. See Donna R. Sandovai, Recent Developments in Employment Law, 3 J. Small & Emerging
Bus. L 451 (1999).
75. See Duffy, supra note 70.
76. Lisa 1. Fried, Parsing Disabiliy Law: Court's ADA Rulings are Tough on Plaintiffs, 222
N.Y.L.. 1. 5 (July 1, 1999).
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a sensible result." The writer recognized that the discrimination facing
nearsighted people is much different than that facing paralyzed people.7"
B. Cases Following the Sutton Reasoning
In the six months after Sutton was decided, there were over 100 reported cases
announced citing Sutton. Immediately after Sutton, the Supreme Cotirt vacated and
remanded several cases to be reconsidered in light of this decision, including
several from the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court has evaluated
uncorrected or unmitigated disabilities before, both following and criticizing this
reasoning. Before Sutton, the Fifth Circuit developed a compromise position by
only looking at serious impairments in the unmitigated state." HCA Health
Services of Texas, Inc. v. Washingtons° was a Fifth Circuit case remanded by the
Court after Sutton. In that case the Fifth Circuit reasoned that only serious
impairments could be considered without mitigating measures.3' Washington was
an accountant with Adult Stills Disease 2 which is controlled by daily medication.
He was fired shortly after requesting to limit his working hours to ten a day (fifty
hours a week). The Fifth Circuit held that the ADA definition of "disabled" was
not "unambiguously clear" so the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance and legislative
history of the ADA needed to be considered. After a close reading of these
sources, the court held that only serious impairments analogous to those mentioned
in the guidelines and legislative history could be considered without mitigating
measures.
The court divided impairments into two groups: continuous and permanent.
The court of appeals reasoned that those impairments which are continuous and
recurring should be considered without mitigating measures, while permanent
corrections should be considered with mitigating measures." The court reasoned
that Adult Stills Disease is like diabetes. Both are serious diseases that require
daily medication. Diabetes is discussed in the Interpretive Guidance as
substantially limiting "because the individual cannot perform major life activities
without the aid of medication."" Therefore, Washington's impairment could be
considered without mitigating measures.
However, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's
judgment and remanded Washington to be resolved in light of Sutton and Murphy.
The Fifth Circuit likewise vacated its judgment and remanded the case to the
77. Editorial, Redefining Disability, 157 N.J.L.J. 446 (Aug. 2, 1999).
78. Ild.
79. Lionel M. Schooler, A Big Year for the ADA: New Rulings Affect Disability and
Discrimination Claims, 15 Tex. Law. 19. 36 (July 19, 1999).
80. 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999).
81. 152 F.3d 464 (Sth Cir. 1998).
82. A degenerative rheumatoid condition, a form of arthritis with systematic illness. Medical
Dictionary (visited Mar. 10. 2000) <htp'.//www.medicinenet.com>.
83. Washington, 152 F.3d 464.470-71.
84. EEOC Title I Interpretive Guidance § 1630.2(j). See U.S. EEOC Technical Assistance
Program, Disability Discrimination App. 10-B (1998).
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district court. Now that deference to the EEOC is not necessary, the two-tiered
distinction between serious and less serious impairments will probably ,be
abandoned." If the district court follows the other federal courts, it will consider
Washington in his mitigated state and probably find that he is not substantially
limited and therefore not disabled.
In Deas v. River West, LP., the Fifth Circuit held that although Deas suffered
from epileptic seizures, she was not disabled under the ADA. Even though this
case was decided before Sutton, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
after Sutton was announced. A substance abuse clinic terminated Deas from her
employment as an Addiction Technician when the doctor in charge noticed that
Deas had petit mal seizures" that caused her temporary lack of awareness while at
work. The court held that seizures were not a per se disability because there are
many variations of symptoms and causes. Therefore, any determination must be
made on a case-by-case basis. Deas failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove
her individual disability. The court also rejected "awareness" as a major life
activity. In addition, Deas was not substantially limited in working because it was
only this particular job at the substance abuse clinic that she could not perform, due
to her lack of the required heightened awareness.
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.J. Gallagher Co.," the.
Fifth Circuit held that an employee's myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS), a form of
blood cancer, 9 was not a substantial limitation on his major life activity of
working. After being treated for his cancer, the doctors declared Boyle to be in
remission and informed Boyle that he could go back to work. Boyle was President
of R. J. Gallagher Company, but the CEO and Chairman of the Board wanted him
to resign. Subsequently, Gallagher Company demoted Boyle; in response, Boyle
filed an action against the company. The court followed Sutton, holding that
Boyle's condition must be considered with mitigating measures. According to
Boyle and his doctors, he was able to work in spite of his illness. Therefore, Boyle
did not qualify as "disabled." However, the court did find that there were questions
of fact concerning whether he had a record of impairment or whether he was
regarded as disabled. Due to these questions the court remanded the case.
In Adams v. Autozoners, Inc.," a court in the Eastern District of Louisiana held
that the petitioner did not prove that his Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
substantially limited a major life activity. Autozoners' managers had documented
more than thirty infractions during Adams's almost five years of employment. He
was eventually fired for insubordination. Adams subsquently filed suit under the
ADA. The court found that he did not satisfy any of the three prongs of the
disability definition. Following Sutton, the court found that Adams did not prove
85. Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1999).
86. 152 F.3d 471 (th Cir. 1998).
87. A form of epilepsy with brief lapses in consciousness, also known as absence seizures.
Medical Dictionary (visited Mar. 10. 2000) <http'//www.medicinenet.com>.
88. 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999).
89. Medical Dictionary (visited Mar. 10. 2000) <httpJ/www.medicinenet.com>.
90. No. Civ. A. 98-2336. 1999 WL 744039 (E.D. La. Sept. 23. 1999).
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he was substantially limited in a major life activity. The court also held that he was
not "regarded as" disabled nor did he have a record of impairment. Adams neither
told his employer about his condition nor asked for any accommodation for his
PTSD. Therefore, Adams could not prove that he was regarded as disabled or that
he had a record of impairment."
In Todd v. Academy Corp. ,92 the district court held that although epilepsy is a
physical impairment under the ADA, with medication it did not substantially limit
Todd's major life activity. Academy fired Todd for purportedly missing too many
consecutive days of work. Todd claimed that he was fired because of his disability.
The court held that although Todd had epilepsy, he was not disabled under the
ADA. The court noted that, before Sutton, "epilepsy would, without question, be
considered a substantial limitation on several major life activities, and a person
suffering from epilepsy would receive nearly automatic ADA protection."
However, following Sutton, the court reasoned that Todd had to be considered with
the mitigating measures of medication and self-help. Todd is aware of oncoming
seizures, has time to remove himself to a safer place and is only temporarily
affected. These seizures occur for about fifteen seconds at a maximum of once per
week. The court did not feel that this was a substantial limitation on any life
activity and therefore held that Todd was not disabled.
In Taylor v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, Inc.," the plaintiff suffered
from sleep apnea 5 that was corrected with the use of a Constant Positive Air
Pressure (CPAP) machine." However, Taylor was not diagnosed until after he
was fired for poor work performance. Taylor asked his employer to reconsider his
termination based on the new diagnosis but was denied. Following Sutton, the
court held that Taylor should be assessed using the CPAP machine. With the
CPAP machine, Taylor's condition is fully corrected and he is not substantially
limited in any major life activity. Taylor could not claim "record of" or "regarded
as" discrimination because he did not inform his employer of his problem until
after he was terminated. Therefore, the employer could not have discriminated
against him under these prongs because it was not even aware that Taylor suffered
from sleep apnea."
C. Cases Distinguishing Sutton's Reasoning
Although most of the ADA cases since the rulings have followed Sutton,
Murphy, and Albertson's, a few cases have tried to narrow their effect. One federal
91. Id.
92. 57 F. Supp. 2d 448,449 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
93. Id. at 452.
94. 55 F. Supp. 2d 604, (N.D. Tex. 1999).
95. Sleep apnea stops breathing temporarily during sleep causing daytime sleepiness. Medical
Dictionary (visited Mar. 10, 2000) <http.//www.medicinenet.com>.
96, . CPAP bedside machines send a flow of air into the nose and throat through a nasal mask
during sleep. The 'Lectric Law Ubrary Lawcopedia's Law & Medicine Medical Malpractice Topic
Area (visited Mar. 10, 2000) <http:J/192.41.4.29med/mcd2O.htm>.
97. Taylor, 55F. Supp. 2d 604,611-12,
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judge narrowed the impact of Sutton by only applying it to cases in which the
disability was fully corrected. In Menkowitz v. Pottsdown Memorial Medical
Center,9" a surgeon with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD)' could not fully correct
his condition because he had to take lower dosages of medication so that he could
still perform his job duties."® Therefore, his disability was not fully controlled and
he still suffered from the effects of the ADD. A similar reasoning was used in Belk
v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ' in which the court found that a polio victim's
leg brace did not allow him to function as he could had he not had polio, therefore
he was found to be "clearly" disabled.
Another case has narrowed the Supreme Court's meaning of "substantially
limited in the major life activity of working." In Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of
America, Inc., °e an employee who was unable to go back to her normal work hours
after a severe car accident claimed discrimination based on her disability, which
substantially limited her work. In Sutton, the court said that one was substantially
limited if precluded from a broad range of jobs."' However, in Fjellestad, the
Eighth Circuit held that the employee had proven that she was substantially limited
when factoring in training, geographical area, and similarjobs. The employee was
not required to prove that she was limited from any other jobs.'"'
VI. APPLYING SUTTON'S ANALYSIS
Before Sutton, there were certain conditions that were thought to be almostper
se disabilities. This class included those with blindness, mental retardation, and
insulin-dependent diabetes. Other conditions and diseases were thought to be
disabilities as long as the condition was severe enough. Examples include epilepsy,
hypertension, and learning disabilities.' °5 Of course, there always had to be an
individual determination for each case.
After Sutton, no one can be reasonably certain whether one particular disease
or condition will or will not be considered a disability. In the three Supreme Court
decisions discussed in this note, one concerned a plaintiff with hypertension, and
another plaintiff had the use of only one eye. Both of these seem to be disabilities,
but the Court held otherwise: Of the Fifth Circuit cases discussed, mild epilepsy,
sleep apnea, PTSD and blood cancer were all declared not to be disabilities. Now,
looking at these classifications may be too general, and there must be an
individualized inquiry for each claimed disability. Perhaps the "truly" disabled will
not make it to trial. On the other hand, sympathetic plaintiffs with real disabilities
98. No. Civ. A. 97-2669, 1999 WL410362 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1999).
99. Inability to control behavior as a result of difficulty in processing neural stimuli. Medical
Dictionary (visited Mar. 10, 2000) <http:I/www.medicinenet.com>.
100. Federal Judge: Jury Should Decide Some ADA Cases ifDisability Not Fully Controlled, 22
Pa. L Wkly. 872 (1999).
101. 194 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1999).
102. 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999).
103. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151 (1999).
104. Fjellestad, 188 P.3d at 955.
105. Karen H. Henry, ADA 10 Steps to Compliance (1999).
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may be prevailing in settlement. It is possible that the only cases making it to court
are more on the frivolous side. This may explain why the courts' decisions appear
harsh to plaintiffs. However, now that employers are more aware of the standard,
maybe it will be epsier for them to make correct decisions and more likely that they
will lose cases where they in fact discriminated.
The statistics show that few cases that make it to federal appellate court are
decided in favor of the plaintiff. In a study of federal appellate cases, it was found
that nationally about 6% of the cases that are appealed were decided in favor of the
plaintiff in district court."m  On appeal, about half of those are affirmed. In the
Fifth Circuit, only five of the thirty cases appealed were decided in favor of the
plaintiff in district court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed only one of these cases. To
make the plight of the plaintiff even worse, the Fifth Circuit's affirmances for the
defendant are hard to gauge and could be really as high as 104 (rather than 23 as
stated in this report)."v Even considering possible error, these statistics show the
pro-employer stance of the courts.
Other statistics about the effects of the ADA are even less promising for the
disabled. Between 1992 and 1997, 90,000 discrimination complaints were filed
with the EEOC. Of these, 63% were for wrongful termination, 10% for hiring
violations, and 29% for failure to provide reasonable accommodations. Over $174
million has been paid in settlements. However, one study has found that since the
ADA was passed employment rates for the disabled have actually dropped. It
claims that "[t]his decline represents a clear break from past trends for both
disabled and non-disabled workers, and therefore seems likely to have been caused
by the ADA."' "as The authors claim that fear and concern about costs related to
ADA provisions have kept mid-sized companies from hiring disabled employees.
They found that the biggest effect of the ADA is on reduced hiring, not
termination. " These statistics once again show that the disabled are not receiving
a huge windfall from the ADA. The United States Commission on Civil Rights
reports that media portrayal of the ADA has misled people and caused a negative
view and misunderstanding of the law. This negative portrayal has contributed to
the tension between disabled employees and employers."'
106. This study considered all decisions available on Westlaw from 1992 through July 1998 as
well as other cases that could be obtained. Other studies have proven that plaintiffs are more successful
in published opinions than in unpublished opinions. Therefore, the unpublished opinions should only
strengthen Colkers position. See Colker, supra note 20. at 104.
107. Id.
108. Les Picker, Consequences of the Americans With Disabilities Act, (visited Mar. 10, 2000)
<httpJ/www.nber.org/digest/dec9s/w6670.html> (reviewing Damn Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist,
Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of The Americans With Disabilities Act, NBER
Working Paper No. 6670).
109. it
110. Colker, supra note 20, at 99.
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VII. A STATE LAW SOLUTION FOR THE DISABLED?
A. State Disability Discrimination Laws
Claimants may now turn to state courts more often for relief as a result of this
heightened threshold under the ADA."' The viability of state court relief will turn
on how closely state disability laws track the federal ADA. In states that do not
closely follow the ADA, there is a better chance for relief. In some states that
closely mirror the ADA this will not prove very helpful. For instance, the Arkansas
Civil Rights Act (ACRA) closely parallels the language of the ADA as evidenced
in the definition of disability, "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits a major life function.""' The Eighth Circuit has already ruled that the
ACRA definition of disability is in "all relevant respects the same" as the ADA." 3
Although this case was decided before Sutton, it is to be expected that ACRA
claims will suffer the same fate as ADA claims. Therefore, the citizens of
Arkansas will find no greater relief in state court. States with broader definitions
of disability, such as New Jersey, should provide more relief than the federal ADA.
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) has a broad definition of
"handicapped" which includes epilepsy and visual impediment." 4 The courts have
already held that the LAD definition differs from the ADA with respect to the
"major life activity component." ''  It has also been held that LAD is a remedial
statute and should be construed liberally." 6 Therefore, New Jersey plaintiffs may
be more successful filing a state law claim for discrimination.
B. Louisiana Law on Disability Discrimination
In Louisiana, state remedies may not prove to be any more favorable than the
ADA because Louisiana law closely follows the ADA wording and jurisprudence.
However, at least one author argues that there are enough differences in language
between the federal and Louisiana statutes that Louisiana courts can choose a
different interpretation than the federal courts. "' In addition, Louisiana has its own
employment discrimination statutes and constitutional protections. The Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 expressly provides the "Right to Individual Dignity." It
specifically prohibits discrimination based on birth and physical condition."" The
IlI. Marcia Coyle, ADA: Clarified or Ruined?, Nat'l L J., July 5, 1999, at Al.
112. Ark. Code Ann. § 16.123.102(3)(MichieSupp. 1999); seeTheresa M. BeinerAn Overview
of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, 50 Ark. L Rev. 165 (1997).
113. The Arkansas Supreme Court had not yet decided whether food allergies am disabilities, so
the Eighth Circuit panel decided what it "would probably hold." Land v. Baptist Medical Center, 164
F.3d 423, 425 (8th Cir. 1999).
114. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5(q) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1999).
115. Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1998).
116. Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782 (D.NJ. 1997).
117. Gerald J. "Jerry" Huffman, Jr., The New Louisiana Employment Statutes: What Hath the
Legislature Wrought, 58 La. L Rev. 1033 (1998).
118. La.Const.art.l,§3.
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Louisiana Civil Rights Act for Handicapped Persons (LCRAHP) also protects the
disabled from discrimination." 9 The Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law,
which covers private discrimination, was promulgated in 1997 to "consolidate
employment discrimination provisions of law into one Chapter."'' " This Act
defines "disabled person," "impairment," and "major life activities" almost exactly
as in the ADA."'
However, there is an "adaptive devices" measure in Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:323 (the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law) that might help potential
plaintiffs. Under this provision, one of the prohibited discriminatory practices is
not hiring a potential employee because he/she would need to provide his/her own
"adaptive devices" in order to perform the job. "Adaptive measures" is defined as
"any items utilized to compensate for a physical or mental impairment, including
but not limited to braces or other supports, wheelchairs, talking boards, hearing
aids, corrective devices, corrective lenses, or seeing eye dogs."'2 In Sutton's case,
her corrective lenses would have been considered adaptive devices. According to
the statute, she would be protected from discrimination based on this. United
would still have defenses, but the plaintiff's burden would be reduced initially,
making it easier to prove the threshold definition of disability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Sutton will not kill the ADA as some advocates for the disabled fear. As one
writer states, "[flar from closing the floodgates on claims brought under the ADA,
the new decisions may merely redraw the battle lines between employers and their
employees claiming disability discrimination."'23 It will be harder for plaintiffs to
prove that they are disabled. The decision will cause a shift in ADA cases to a
focus on proving a "substantial limitation of a major life activity." Almost all of
the cases following Sutton have focused on this aspect of the definition. In
addition, more claims will be filed focusing on the "regarded as" prong of
disability.
There will probably be fewer cases that are truly affected by this decision than
some fear. Most frivolous cases do not get past the EEOC and most truly
legitimate claims probably end in settlement. In addition, the courts will find a way
around Sutton when the facts are such that they want to allow recovery. This
maneuvering is demonstrated in the Menkowitz Belk and Fjellestad cases. 24 In
addition, state laws may help disabled in some states. State legislators could also
be encouraged to pass more favorable legislation for their constituents.
119. LCRAHP only applies to education facilities, real estate transactions and programs that
receive financial assistance from the state or its subdivisions. La. R.S. 46:2254(A) (1999).
120. La. R.S. 23:301 (1998).
121. La. RS. 23:322(3), (6), and (7) (1998).
122. La. R.S. 23:322(l) (1998) (emphasis added).
123. Anthony B. Hailer. From the Defense Perspective: There's More Than Meets the Eye in
Supreme Court's ADA Cases, 22 Pa. L Wkly. 32 (1999).
124. See supra notes 98, 101-104 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the definition of disability should be rewritten to be less ambiguous
and to create a more specific protected class. One possibility is to re-write the
ADA in a way that allows people to claim disability by satisfying a lesser threshold
requirement. The burden will then shift to the employer to show why certain
standards are needed because of ajob related activity as is already provided. The
focus of the ADA dispute should be less concerned about whether the person is
"disabled" and more about whether the person was discriminated against. The
ADA was passed to prevent discrimination against persons with impairments, not
to create litigation over who is "disabled."
Allison Duncan*
* Special thanks to Professor John V. White for his advice and guidance.
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